State lotteries currently operate in 43 states across the US. Recently, three states have privatized their lottery operations, handing over the management of their lotteries to private companies in hopes of generating greater revenues for the state governments. Questions arise regarding the economic rationale for this decision and an economic model is presented to determine whether one state, Illinois, has been successful at generating more state transfer revenues as a result of privatization in its first year of results. The issue of lottery privatization is also examined in the larger context of overall growth in the gambling industry in the United States with particular attention paid to sports gambling.
Introduction to Lotteries in the US
Since 1964, when New Hampshire became the first state to offer a state-run lottery in the 20 th century, lotteries have become commonplace around the US. As of 2013, 43 states and the District of Columbia offered lotteries and these games have become a small but important component of state revenues. In 2011, state lotteries generated more than $18 billion for state governments, representing 1.7% of all government revenues generated by states excluding transfers from the federal government (Humphreys and Matheson, 2013) .
Early in American history, lotteries were quite common but also were generally operated by private organizations, not by state governments. For example, the construction and expansion of many early private American universities, including Harvard and Princeton, were financed in part through lottery sales. Prominent American leaders also lent their support to lotteries designed to raise funds for public works. John Hancock's signature appears on lottery tickets sold to fund the construction of Faneuil Hall while George Washington administered the unsuccessful 1768 Mountain Road Lottery in Virginia, and Ben Franklin organized a lottery during the American Revolution to finance the purchase of cannons to aid in the defense of Philadelphia (Matheson and Grote, 2008) .
While the organization and operation of lotteries in early America was generally undertaken by private individuals and groups, governments still had a role in authorizing lotteries. For example, in 1612 King James I of England issued a royal decree authorizing the Virginia Company to create a lottery to provide funds for Jamestown, the first English colony in America. Between 1612 and 1621, the company raised 29,000 pounds sterling to support the colony (Jamestown-Yorktown Foundation, 2013) . Indeed, the rules regarding the authorization of lotteries were an issue of contention in the lead-up to the Revolutionary War when, in 1769, the British crown attempted to prevent the sale of lottery tickets by groups or individuals that had not received royal permission (Dunstan, 1997) .
Lotteries began to fall out of favor in the early 1800s as governments developed alternative methods of generating revenue, moral objections to lotteries began to rise, and concern about fraud in privately run lotteries increased. New York became the first state to ban new games in 1821 when its constitution was amended to prohibit lotteries not otherwise "previously provided for by law." (Benjamin, 2013) In 1833, New York ended lotteries completely and was joined in its prohibition by Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Within just a few years most states had stopped authorizing lotteries, and by 1860 only Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri still allowed these games of chance (Dunstan, 1997 
Introduction to Casinos in the US
Throughout much of American history, many taverns and roadhouses permitted card and dice games, but large dedicated casinos were rare. In the early 1800s, the same moral objections that rose against lotteries led to a disapproval of this type of gaming, particularly in the East. By the 1840s, the center of casino gaming had moved to riverboats on the Mississippi River and to New Orleans (Dunstan, 1997) . While recreational gambling was generally considered acceptable in the region, professional gamblers and card sharps were looked down upon with severe disfavor.
The American Civil War along with the burgeoning rail system in the country led to the decline of the great riverboats. In their place, casinos began to flourish temporarily in mining boom towns such as San Francisco (1849) 
Introduction to Pari-mutuel Betting in the US
Horse racing and other forms of pari-mutuel racing are another form of gambling with a long history in the US. The first horse racing track was laid in 1665 on Long Island in New York, and tracks spread throughout the country with the expansion of the nation. In 1865, parimutuel betting was invented by Pierre Oller, a French perfume shop keeper and rapidly became the standard for horse racing. By the early 1900s, the general anti-gambling ideals of the nation, which led to the decline of legal casinos and lotteries, also eliminated betting at horse tracks everywhere in the country except for Maryland and Kentucky (Nash, 2009) . The advent of the Great Depression in the 1930s led to an expansion of many forms of gambling as a form of economic stimulus including horse racing and charitable bingo.
After peaking in the mid-1970s, horse racing has suffered a gradual decline in general interest, at least in part due to the expansion of other types of legalized gambling, including lotteries and casinos (Nash, 2009 ). The total handle wagered on US races totaled $10.9 billion in 2012 although net betting revenue is a fraction of this figure (LaMarra, 2013). As of 2012, 78 tracks in 28 states offered thoroughbred racing and 36 tracks in 16 states offered harness racing.
Most tracks have a betting window that offers a variety of general pari-mutuel bets. Many tracks also offer simulcast betting on races at other tracks, and 49 tracks in 14 states also offer some type of additional gaming ranging from full service casinos to video lottery terminals or other electronic gaming devices (American Gaming Association, 2013).
Introduction to Sports Gambling in US
As noted previously, gambling on horse racing has a long history in the US. Betting on other sporting events grew in line with the growth of organized sports in the late 1800s and early Following the formation of professional leagues, "pool cards," which allowed bettors to gamble on a slate of games, became popular although not generally legal. Following in the footsteps of its casino businesses, Nevada officially legalized sports gambling in 1949, but major casinos didn't join until Stardust opened a sports book in 1976.
The main impetus that led to the establishment of large, commercial sports books at Nevada casinos was the US elimination of a 10% tax on sports gambling in 1974. This tax law change led to an increase in sports gambling handle in Nevada from $825,767 in 1973 to $3,873,217 in 1974 and $26,170,328 in 1975 (NFL v. Delaware, 1977 
Privatization of State Lotteries
Standard economic theory generally states that free markets lead to optimal allocations of resources, suggesting that government intervention in the marketplace through the control of firms is unlikely to lead to improvements in societal welfare. Furthermore, since government firms do not operate by the same profit incentives that motivate private business owners, there is again concern that state-owned enterprises will fail to achieve the efficiency and productivity of which private firms are capable. On a grand scale, the economic success of western capitalistic nations compared to the economic stagnation experienced by the socialist former Soviet Bloc countries clearly highlighted the efficiency advantages of privately owned firms. The trend around the world over the past several decades has been one of reduced state-ownership of companies.
Of course, in cases where market failure exists, private firms are less likely to provide optimal outcomes. State-owned enterprises may provide relief in these cases. In many circumstances involving market failures, it is easy to find examples of state-owned enterprises selling goods and services to the public often in direct competition with private pro-profit or private non-profit firms. With respect to public goods, governments often provide public hospitals, parks, and schools. When natural monopolies exist, governments may directly sell goods like municipal water or electricity as opposed to allowing a highly regulated monopoly to exist. When firms sell products with significant negative externalities, government control of the retail establishment may reduce the likelihood of a profit-seeking firm selling more than the societally efficient level of production. For example, liquor stores in many states and cities in the US are government owned. Of course, state ownership is not the only solution to the problem of firms selling products with negative externalities. Most liquor stores in the US are not stateowned enterprises but instead private firms subject to strict government regulation.
With the privatization of lotteries, private firms are granted local monopolies and maximization of revenue may not by societally optimal, particularly with respect to concerns about problem gaming or the distributional impact of government revenue generation. As a case in point, in Camelot's failed bid to win the contract for Illinois' lottery in 2011, the company planned to increase annual per capita lottery ticket sales in the state from $171 in 2010 to $292 in 2016 and in particular to raise annual sales on instant games from $92 to $161 per person (Illinois Lottery, 2010) . While increasing ticket sales is unquestionably good from a revenue generation or profit maximization perspective, there is a real public policy question about raising government revenue in this manner. Given the fact that lottery players are disproportionally poor(especially those who play instant games) encouraging the consumption of a product that, on average, makes the poor poorer in order to supplement the incomes of the poor and provide funding for other state programs seems questionable at best
Other questions also exist. Is sufficient innovation possible in the lottery industry to warrant introduction of a middleman who will take a portion of the profits? Privatization often succeeds in increasing profits by cutting costs, but the administrative costs of most state lotteries are only about 5% of revenues, limiting the efficiency gains that would be possible. Since most of the revenue gains from privatization would come from expanding revenues rather than cutting costs, there is the real question of whether gambling expansion is socially desirable. Often projections of increased revenue are driven by the introduction of video lottery terminals, internet gaming, or expanded advertising, all of which could be done without privatization of the lottery. Finally, it is important to ask whether states can write contracts that prevent privatization of profits when privatized lotteries do well, but socialization of losses when lotteries fail to meet expectations.
Model and Methodology
In order to test the effect of privatizing a lottery, regression analysis will be performed on state-level data over time to determine the impact of state-level economic and demographic data on the level of transfers that a state lottery generates for the government. Previous contributions to the lottery literature have suggested many demographic and economic variables to explain the level of lottery sales in a state. Selecting from those variables, the current study will use population, income level, and the unemployment rate of a state to explain the level of transfers that a state lottery generates for the state government. Lottery sales and lottery transfers are directly related to one another since more lottery sales will lead to more dollars transferred to the government. Because of the direct relationship between the two, it is reasonable to assume that any demographic or economic variables that affect lottery sales would have a similar effect on transfers to the government, even though dollars transferred will be lower than lottery sales due to prize payouts and commissions. Transfers are the preferred variable for the current study because of the prediction that privatization can generate more revenues to the state. The corollary to that prediction is that the revenues transferred should be higher, not that sales dollars are necessarily higher although higher sales are certainly one way to generate more transfers.
There is a rich lottery literature with a variety of contributions that test the impact of demographic and economic variables on lottery sales either within single states or across numerous states. Considering only the variables used in the current model, the empirical results from these studies on population are consistent; however, there are mixed empirical results on unemployment rates and income. A number of studies, including Clotfelter and Cook (1989) , Ashley, Liu and Chang (1999) and Frees and Miller (2004) find that population has a positive impact on state lottery sales. Regarding the unemployment rate, Mikesell (1994) and Scott and Garen (1994) both find that a higher unemployment has a positive impact on state lottery sales.
However, DeBoer (1990) between unemployment rates and lottery sales is an affirmation of prospect theory, "that individuals become more risk loving when they suffer a financial shock," even though that particular study does not support the theory empirically (Blalock, Just and Simon 2007, pp. 560-1) . It may also be that lottery ticket sales are a normal good and, as opportunities to earn income decline due to higher unemployment rates, so, do state lottery sales, predicting a negative relationship between unemployment rates and sales.
The regressive nature of lottery sales along with the question of whether lotteries are normal goods applies equally to the results regarding state income and income per capita on sales and sales per capita in the lottery literature. The general results are that while lottery sales are regressive in nature, implying that lower income households tend to spend a higher percentage of their income on lottery products than higher income households, they also tend to be normal goods, implying that sales dollars increase with higher incomes. 1 This finding, however, is not consistent across the literature, with some studies finding the opposite results or no impact of income on lottery sales (in dollars or in per capita dollars, depending on the study).
Three different models are proposed and tested, using some combination of the variables previously described. The goal of privatization is to increase revenue transfers from the state's lottery games. Furthermore, tests on both of the dependent variables (change in transfers and change in transfers per capita) indicate that the variables have unit roots. Thus, rather than using transfers or transfers per capita as the dependent variables, the models will use change in transfers and change in transfers per capita as the dependent variables to correct for the unit roots and to emphasize that transfers are expected to increase when the lottery is run by a private firm rather than by a state agency. If individuals in the state are to be made better off through the management by a private firm, then transfer dollars per capita should rise as well.
1 Studies that confirm either or both of these implications include Brinner and Clotfelter (1975) , Clotfelter and Cook (1989) , Frees and Miller (2004) , Blalock, Just and Simon (2007) .
The following models are tested empirically: The privatization dummy is set equal to one if a state has ceded control of its lottery to a private management firm. Since the data set only includes observations through 2012, in effect, this analysis will only capture the effects of the first year of Illinois privatization. In other words, the number of private state-year observations is only one at time of writing.
It should be noted that the initial year of Northstar's operation of the Illinois Lottery is best described as problematic. The company promised $851 million in ticket sales, but only delivered $757 million, The company blamed foot-dragging by the state government in their promise to introduce expanded VLT gaming, but the firm was ultimately fined $20 million for failing to meet its revenue targets. (Garcia 2013) As an aside, the actual revenues generated nearly exactly matched the projections made by Camelot in their failed bid to operate the lottery. 
Results
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the model, while the results of the regression analyses are provided in Tables 2 and 3 . Overall, the results reveal that the only variables with a statistically significant impact on the change in transfers of lottery revenue are the change in state income and the change in the unemployment rate. In each of the two regressions without state fixed effects or time effects, change in income has a positive and significant effect on change in transfers, but this same relationship does not hold true on a per capita basis (see Table 3 ). The coefficients in these two regressions are 0.0006 and 0. On the other hand, since the unemployment rate in Illinois actually increased from 2011 to 2012 from 9.0% to 9.4%, and given the negative coefficient on the unemployment rate in all of the models, this indicates that things actually could have been much worse for the Illinois government in terms of transfers received from lottery sales. While the Illinois Lottery fell far short of the lofty promises made by Northstar, the actual revenues generated were slightly higher than would have been predicted given the state of the Illinois economy (although, naturally, care must be taken in place too much confidence in statistically insignificant coefficients.) Using the (non-statistically significant) point estimates on the Privatization Dummy for the 6 models tested, the Illinois Lottery in 2012 generated between $21.2 million and $28.9 million more than would have been predicted based on Illinois' historical experience and its economic climate during that year. Combine these potential gains with the additional $20 million fine the state collected from Northstar due to the company's failure to meet its revenue projections, and a case can be made that privatization has actually been quite a positive experience for the state.
Conclusion and Future Research
State-run lotteries offer products to consumers that add to the variety of other gambling options in the United States. Growth in the lottery industry is discussed in relation to the growth of some of these other options, with a particular focus on sports gambling. As states continue to seek additional ways to increase state transfers from lottery sales, many states are considering the option of privatizing their lottery operations in order to gain from the efficiencies and innovations of a privately operated company. As demonstrated in this paper, however, states
should be cautious about assuming that privately run companies can offer substantial gains in transfer dollars and they may struggle to meet their stated sales goals. While the paper is preliminary in that there is only one year and one state with a full year of privatized operations, the empirical models do indicate that economic variables such as state unemployment rates and state income provide statistically significant predictors of changes in state transfer revenues while privatization of lotteries, based on the limited available data, do not have a significant impact. As states such as Indiana and New Jersey join the ranks of states choosing to privatize their lottery operations, the data set can be expanded to include more observations for privately run state lotteries and the results offered by the expanded model will provide further conclusions on this controversial issue. 
